DCAT-AP-UK: DCAT Application Profile for the UK
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Quantum-ready metadata

Updated 1 section on this page is new or updated since 1.2.0-rc.1 (2026-11-06). Everything that changed

Quantum computers able to break today's public-key cryptography do not exist yet, but data recorded now can be decrypted later. The NCSC asks organisations to plan now. Metadata helps in two ways: it can record the cryptography that protects data in transit, so catalogues become part of the inventory, and it can carry integrity checks that stay trustworthy for decades.

DCAT-AP-UK does not make data or services quantum-safe. It records what protects them, so owners can find and fix what is not. "Quantum-ready" here means ready for the migration, not finished with it.

The NCSC timelineUpdated

  1. By 2028: Define migration goals, complete discovery of where cryptography is used, and build an initial plan.
  2. By 2031: Complete the highest-priority migration activities.
  3. By 2035: Complete migration to post-quantum cryptography across all systems, services and products.

Source: Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptographyS. The post-quantum standards: FIPS 203, 204 and 205V.

What is at risk

What a quantum computer threatens, and what to do
CryptographyThe riskWhat to do
Public-key key exchange (RSA, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman)Broken by a large quantum computer. Data in transit recorded today could be decrypted later.Move to ML-KEM (FIPS 203), first as a hybrid with a classical key exchange. Record it with connection security.
Digital signatures (RSA, ECDSA)Broken by a large quantum computer. Signatures could be forged.Plan for ML-DSA (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) where metadata or data is signed.
Hash functions (SHA-2, SHA-3)Weakened only modestly. SHA-256 stays acceptable for integrity checks.Use SHA-384, SHA-512 or SHA3 for files that must be trusted for decades. Stop using MD5 and SHA-1, which are broken by classical means already.
Symmetric encryption (AES)Weakened only modestly.AES-256 for long-lived secrets. Not recorded in metadata.

Checksums that stay trustworthy

Every checksum names its algorithm from this list. The validator warns about weak algorithms (rule Q-01) but still accepts them, so old records conform.

Checksum algorithms
AlgorithmAdviceIdentifierWhy
SHA-256Acceptablespdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha256Acceptable today and through the quantum transition for integrity checks. Prefer longer outputs for files that must be trusted for decades.
SHA-384Recommendedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha384Recommended for long-lived records.
SHA-512Recommendedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha512Recommended for long-lived records.
SHA3-256Acceptablespdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha3_256A different design from SHA-2; acceptable, and useful for crypto-agility.
SHA3-384Recommendedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha3_384Recommended for long-lived records.
SHA3-512Recommendedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha3_512Recommended for long-lived records.
BLAKE2b-256Acceptablespdx:checksumAlgorithm_blake2b256Acceptable.
BLAKE2b-512Acceptablespdx:checksumAlgorithm_blake2b512Acceptable.
BLAKE3Acceptablespdx:checksumAlgorithm_blake3Acceptable.
SHA-224Weak: warnedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha224Too short for new records. Use SHA-256 or longer.
SHA-1Weak: warnedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_sha1Broken against deliberate collisions. Kept so old records still conform; the validator warns (rule Q-01).
MD5Weak: warnedspdx:checksumAlgorithm_md5Broken. Kept so old records still conform; the validator warns (rule Q-01).

The catalogue as a cryptographic inventory

Data services can record connection security: the key exchange their endpoint uses. The NCSC asks for discovery by 2028; a catalogue that records this answers “which of our APIs still use classical-only key exchange?” with one query.

Connection security values
ValueCodeWhat it means
Hybrid post-quantumukcl:transport-security/pqc-hybridNegotiates a post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM, FIPS 203) combined with a classical one, such as X25519MLKEM768 in TLS 1.3.
Post-quantum onlyukcl:transport-security/pqc-onlyNegotiates a post-quantum key exchange alone.
TLS 1.3 with classical key exchangeukcl:transport-security/tls13-classicalSecure against today's attackers, but data recorded now could be decrypted later by a quantum computer (harvest now, decrypt later). Plan the migration.
TLS 1.2 with classical key exchangeukcl:transport-security/tls12-classicalUpgrade to TLS 1.3 first; post-quantum key exchange needs it.
Not yet assessedukcl:transport-security/not-assessedNot yet checked. Checking is part of the discovery work the NCSC asks for by 2028.
PREFIX dcat: <http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#>
PREFIX dcatuk: <https://w3id.org/dcat-ap-uk/ns#>
PREFIX ukcl: <https://w3id.org/dcat-ap-uk/codelist/>

# Services still on classical-only key exchange, or not yet assessed
SELECT ?service ?endpoint WHERE {
  ?service a dcat:DataService ; dcat:endpointURL ?endpoint .
  OPTIONAL { ?service dcatuk:transportSecurity ?ts }
  FILTER (!BOUND(?ts) || ?ts NOT IN (ukcl:transport-security/pqc-hybrid, ukcl:transport-security/pqc-only))
}

Crypto-agility in metadata

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